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The author analyzes the role of women in the Iraqi economy, 
especially the informal sector, in recent times and considers the effect that 
changes to their role in the economy have had and will have. The paper 
argues that Iraqi women working in the informal sector face a difficult 
future the nature of which will depend largely on their educational 
background, Ba'athist ties during the former regime, the strength of various 
religious groups opposed to women pursuing activities outside the 
household, and the areas in which women attempt to pursue a career. 
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economy; the Ba'ath Party; the Shiites. 
Introduction 
285 
The invisible economy, the informal economy, the shadow economy 
the spontaneot1s economy: these are reJatively new terms coined to 
describe a phenomenon that ·does not appear in the conventional 
statistical analysis of economics. This phenomenon is individual labor 
effort that is unnoticed, ,uncounted and unacknowlydged. Since such 
"informal" work is performed daily by thousands of Iraqi laborers but is 
not included in the country's national income statistics, our image of 
how that country's econon1y is performing is likely to be significantly 
underestimated. 
The informal economy in Iraq has notable diversity and heteroge-
neity in terms of services and commodities offered, scale of activity, 
official recognition, relative labor-capital inputs and location. More 
importantly, Iraq's informal economy is-testament to the entrepreneurial 
abilities of the country's poorest citizens. It is a mixed blessing though. 
While it absorbs thousands who have no way of participating in the 
formal economy, it is by nature precarious. Critics point to urban 
congestion from unregulated downtown street stalls and to health 
hazards from food prepared in unsanitary conditions. The line between 
1 Email address for correspondence: relooney@nps.navy.mil 
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the informal economy and urban crime is often blurred - street vendors 
often sell stolen goods, unlicensed taxi drivers sometimes sell drugs or 
even rob their passengers. 
One of the challenges facing a new _Iraqi government will be that of 
finding ways to encourage the entrepreneurial spirit in the informal 
economy but at the same time to formalize it en0.ugh that some of its 
more negative elements are reduced. In designing strategies for building 
on Iraq's informal economy, policymakers will have to take into account 
' 
several of its present characteristics: 
A large proportion of those involved in the informal economy 
are women and children, reflecting their impoverishment and 
frequent exclusion from the formal economy . 
• 
By nature the informal economy is mostly unregulated and 
untaxed. This accounts for its dynamism, but also limits its 
ability to contribute to the formal economy and 
Most significantly - it is growing. 
The sections below examine Iraq's informal economy from the 
perspective of its main constituency, women. What are the main areas of 
non-farm activity carried out by women? How are these activities 
changing as the country experiences prolonged instability and uncer-
tainty? What are the prospects for improving the condition of women in 
the country's labor force and progression from the informal economy to 
that of formal economic activity? 
Iraq's Three Informal Economies 
Before assessing the situation of women in today's Iraqi economy, it 
is important to first examine the context in which they find themselves. 
In many areas of Iraq, the insurgency is dramatically affecting the 
informal economy through its impact on their daily lives2• Not only are 
women becoming the victims of direct injury and death, but non-
combatants lose every aspect of normalcy. The path to school or the 
marketplace becomes a dangerous journey. With food, electricity and 
medical attention in short supply, misery multiplies and tl1e amount of 
time taken up by simply trying to survive takes a high toll on any efforts 
2 
"Windows of Opportunity: The Pursuit of Gender Equality in Post-War Iraq," Women for 
Women International Briefing Paper (January 2005), p.9. 
\ 
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to elevate one's earnings or earning potential. 
The economic ramifications of past actions under the Saddam 
Hussein regime as well as the difficulties brought , on by the insurgency 
create an informal economy in Iraq quite different from that normally 
found in other countries throughout the Middle East3• In many parts of 
the country women and children find themselves in a situation that has 
many of the classic features of war economies. While in Iraq's case many 
of the motives underlying the insurgency differ from those in other 
conflict states, their actions and economic strategies show some 
similarity to insurgent groups in other parts of the world4 including: 
The destruction or circumvention of the formal economy and 
the growth of informal and black markets, effectively blurring 
the lines between the formal, informal, and criminal sectors 
and activities; 
Pillage, predation, extortion; and deliberate violence against 
civilians is used by extort ransoms, capture trade networks and 
diaspora remittances, and exploit labor; 
High decentralization, both in the means of coercion and in 
the means of production and exchange; 
- The use of, licit or illicit exploitation of trade in lucrative 
" natural resources; 
The reliance on cross border trading networks, regional kin 
and ethnic groups, arms traffickers and mercenaries, as well as 
legally operating commercial entities, each of which may have 
a vested interest in the continuation of conflict and instability. 
To adequately assess the different functions of war economies, 
Jonathan Goodhand5 divides the informal economy into three distinct 
sub-groupings: the "combat", "shadow" and "coping" economies (Table 
1 ). While overlapping somewhat in the Iraqi case, each of these 
economies encompasses a distinct set of actors, motivations and 
economic activities. The fact that these three economies are interrelated 
3 Excellent case studies from many Middle Eastern countries are found in Richard A. Lobban, Jr. 
ed., Middle Eastern Women and the Invisible Economy (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
1998). 
4 Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, "The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict 
TransfoIIllation." Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management 
s Jonathan Goodhand," Afghanistan," in M. Pugh et al., War Economies in a Regional Context: 
Challenges ofTrc1msfonnation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). 
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means develop1nents in each can have significant implications for the 
plight of women in both the informal and formal sectors of the economy. 
The is based on economic interactions that directly sustain actual 
combat. It is dominated by a variety of actors, including the insurgents, 
elements of organized crime, as well as domestic and foreign "conflict 
entrepreneurs'; who supply the necessary weapons and military material. 
Generally, the combat economy serves to fund the war effort of the 
insurgents as well as to achieve the insurgents' political objectives. In 
Iraq, the preferred means of resource generation include robbery/theft, 
kidnappings, and various black market activities. Outside agents include 
former Ba'athist party members and relatives of Saddam Hussein in 
Syria and neighboring countries who are using their ill-gotten fortunes6 
to fund the insurgency's operations in Iraq 
The encompasses the broad range of informal economic relation-
ships that fall outside state-regulated frameworks. Key actors are a 
range of less scrupulous "conflict profiteers including petty criminals 
who seek to benefit from the business opportunities that that open up in 
highly unregulated and chaotic war situations. 
Many of these groups were originally formed in the 1990s in re-
sponse to the high profit margins created by the UN imposed sanctions 
on Iraq. The shadow economy was credited for propping up the 
economy during those turbulent years. While most of the goods and 
services that they produced did not register in the government's books, 
the income they generated enabled Iraqis to survive the crises, work and 
feed themselves. 
Scores of the cross-border relationships cultivated by the various 
smuggler/criminal groups at the time are still in place and operational at 
the present time. Goodhand observes that the shadow economy is 
frequently already widespread before the outbreak of conflict and is a 
permissive factor for conflict when it contributes to violent state 
collapse. Or it serves as a source of income to would-be-rebels. Once 
conflict erupts, shadow economies are easily captured by combatants 
and thus often become the basis for the combat economy7• This has 
6 
"Oil Stained," Newsday (February 13, 2005); Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Aids Say Kin of Hussein 
Aid Insurgency," New York Times (July 5, 2004). 
1 Goodhand, op. cit. 
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Table 1 
Economies, Actors, Motives and Activities During Armed Conflict 
The Combat Economy The Shadow Economy 
Who? Commanders, "conflict Profiteers, transport 
Key Actors entrepreneurs", sector, 
fighters, 
suppliers of weapons 
Why? To fund the war efforts 
Motivations or 
and · achieve military 
Incentives objectives. 
for war Peace may not be in 
and Peace their 




' and wealth. 
Fighters may have an 
interest in peace if 
there 
are alternative sources 
of livelihoods available. 
How? ' Taxation of lid t and 
Key illicit 
Activities economic activities; 






drivers, poppy farmers 
To make a profit on the 
margins ofa conflic t. 
Peace could be in their 
interest if encourages 
long term investment 




to the shadow economy; 
otherwise a criminalized 
war economy will 
become a criminalized 
peace economy. 
Smuggling of high-value 
commodities; mass 
extraction of natural 
resources; Hawalla 
currency order and 
economic blockages of exchange system); aid 
dissenting areas; manipulation. 
asset stripping and 
looting; aid 
1nanipulation 
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The Coping Economy 
Poor families and 
commWlities 
To cope and maintain 
asset bases through 
low risk activities, 
or to survive through 
asset erosion. 
Peace could enable 
families to move 
beyond subsistence. 
Employment of diverse 
Strategies to spread 
risk; subsistence 
Agriculture; petty trade 
and small businesses; 
on-farm and oft:farm 
wage labor; labor 
migration and 
remittances; redistribution 




Source: Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzanche, 




happened. Finally, the comprises those numerous economic interactions 
during armed conflict that provide benefits to the civilian population, 
particularly the poor and most vulnerable. These functions are even 
more important to civilian livelihoods where the formal economy and 
traditional livelihoods are destroyed or rendered difficult or impossible 
to sustain. The coping economy. includes a wide range of activities 
including subsistence agriculture, petty trade, and various out of the 
household businesses - catering, food processing and the line. 
Of the country's three main economic sectors, it's reasonable to 
assume that the coping economy ·has a disproportionate share of the 
country's poverty. Recent data released by the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs indicate that about 5 million Iraqis are living under the 
poverty line, compared with 143,000 in 19938• Significantly the Ministry 
noted that more than one million Iraqi women aged between 25 and 40 
were unmarried while divorce cases were increasing as was child labor. It 
is reasonable to assume that this group of women is firmly entrenched in 
the coping economy. 
Women in the Informal Economy: 
International Comparisons 
While precise data on the participation of women in the Iraqi cop-
ing economy is extremely sketchy, some patterns from other countries 
can assist in arriving at some general orders of magnitude. Here the 
main patterns emerge 9 (Table 2): 
The dominant trend is one of women being over-represented in the 
informal economy 
The informal sector is the primary source of employment for women 
in most developing countries. Furthermore, the majority of economically 
8 
"Five Million Iraqis Live Under Poverty Line: Report," Xinhua News Agency (February 12, 
2004). 
9 Martha Alter Chen, "Women in the lnfonnal Sector: A Global Picture, the Global Movement," 
SAIS Review XXl:l (Winter-Spring 2001), pp.74-76. 
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Table 2 
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active women in developing countries are engaged in the informal 
sector. 
The informal sector is a larger source of employment for women 
than for men. The propbrtion of women workers in the informal sector 
exceeds tha~ of men in most countries. 
In many countries, women's share of the total informal workforce 
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outside of agriculture is higher than that of men. 
The composition of the female informal workforce varies somewhat 
across regions. In many African countries, almost all women in the 
informal sector are either self-employed or unpaid workers in family 
enterprises. In many countries in Latin America and Asia, although the 
majority of workers are self-employed or contributing family members, 
at least 20 percent of women in the informal sector are casual wage 
workers. 
Several other common patterns typify women's participation in the 
informal economy. They are more likely to be own account workers, i.e., 
self-employed working by themselves, and subcontract workers and are 
less likely to be owner operators or paid employees of informal 
enterprises. The vast majority of women in the informal sector are 
home-based workers or street vendors. In this regard approximately 85 
percent of home-based workers across countries are women. 
Table 3 
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Finally informal traders, mainly street vendors, represent (Table 3) 





The Economics of Coping: the Plight of Women in Iraq's Informal Economy 293 
a very high proportion (73~99%) of employment in trade and a 
significant share (50 to 90 percent) of trade Gross Domestic Product. 
Street vendors constitute a significant share of total employment in the 
informal sector and street vending units constitute a significant share of 
total enterprises in the informal sector. Women account for between 50 
and 90 percent of informal employment in trades, except in those 
countries share social norms restrict women's mobility outside the home, 
such as Tunisia and India (Table 3). 
The restrictions on Iraqi women are likely to be similar to those in 
Tunisia, so it is reasonable to expect that women even during normal 
times will be more confined to areas of the informal economy O·utside of 
trading. In fact, in Iraq's current environment one finds even fewer . 
women is working in the markets and as street venders. Accounts 
abound of poor women, who occupied informal sector jobs in markets 
and in the streets, forced to stop working out of constant fear of violence 
and attack. The somewhat predictable violence that was the hallmark of · 
the Hussein regime was transformed in the post-invasion period into 
general violence. Fear of abc,luction, rape, and murder keep many 
women confined to their homes. 
Even casual observers note the marked absence of women vendors, 
particularly in Baghd.ad, but increasingly through Iraq10• In essence, the 
conflict economy has had a disproportionate negative impact on this 
important segment of the coping economy 
As of ten months after the fall of Saddam Hussein Iraqi women 
have only just started to leave their houses to carry out ordinary tasks 
such as taking their kids to school, shopping or visiting neighbors. They 
do so despite the risk of kidnapping or worse. It is women and children 
who bear the brunt of the absence of law and order, the lack of security 
and the availability ofweapons11• 
As violent. conflict continues, female heads of household in particu-
lar face a significant economic burden as work in the formal sector has 
contracted. Women are currently most likely to engage in selling 
products from home, catering, or in small-scale agriculture. However, 
10 Windows of Opportunity: The Pursuit of Gender Equality in Post-War Iraq, Women for 
Women International Briefing Paper (January 2005), p.14. 
11 Haifa Zangana, "Why Iraqi W 01nen Aren't Complaining," The Guardian, February I 9, 2004. 
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the constraints posed by the insurgency tl1rough creating inadequate 
electricity, water, and other supplies directly impact their economic 
situation to the extent that the overwhelming majority of women are not 
'earning any income12• 
The conflict economy is only one factor conditioning the types of 
employment and income generating possibilities available to women in 
the coping economy. The plight of women in other parts of the informal 
economy has been affected by a wide range of historical and contempo-
rary factors. In particular the economic situation of Iraqi women today is 
women today are still strongly influenced by events and policies in the 
Saddam era. 
Shifting Position of Women in the Iraqi Economy 
In the 1920s and 1930s women in Iraq began working and accepting 
positions .in the job market. In 1970 the Iraqi constitution under Saddam 
Hussein, declared all women and rnen equal before the law. The 1970s 
and early 1980s were years of economic growth in Iraq and state-
sponsored policies focused on eradicating illiteracy, educate women and 
incorporate them into the labor force. Labor at the time was scarce and 
the Iraqi government, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, chose to tap into its 
own human resources and hire women. Women in Iraq became among 
the most educated and professional in the entire region, and working 
outside the home became the norm. For the most part, women during 
this period could find and retain jobs, obtain higher education, and 
receive extensive medical coverage. 
As a result, prior to 1991 women constituted 23% of the work force 
wllich is high compared to neighboring countries in the Arab Region. A 
majority of women workers were middle level professionals - mainly in 
the public sector. If the official figures included women in involved in 
informal agricultural activities their share of the workforce would have 
been considerably higher13• 
The economic sanctions of the 1990s influenced women's economic 
contribution in several ways. On the one hand their share in the formal 
12 Windows of Opportunity: The Pursuit of Gender Equality in Post-War Iraq, Women for 
Women International Briefing Paper (January 2005), p.9. 
13 ILO Multidisciplinary Mission to Iraq: 28 April - 5 May 2000 (Geneva: lLO, 2000) p. 4. 
The Journal of Socia~ Political and Economic Studies 
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public sector employment increased. In part, this shift stemmed from a 
high male drop-out rate in the public sector as heads of households 
sought higher paying jobs in the private sector. Most women in public 
positions stayed on preferring the relative economic security provided by 
government. For those women not in the public sector, home based 
income generating activities increased rapidly as a coping strategy to 
combat the deteriorating standard of living experienced by most Iraqis 
during this period14• 
Overal~ however, the years of UN sanctions took a devastating toll 
on women, limiting their access to food, healthcare and education. As 
noted, before 1991, female literacy rates.in Iraq were the highest in the 
region. Iraq had achieved nearly universal primary education for girls · 
and boys. According to the United Nations the overall literacy rate for 
the nation has been cut in half, sinking from 80 percent in 1987 to 40 
percent currently15• -
The social status of women also deteriorated in the 1990s. With an 
economy shattered by wars and international sanctions, the government 
encouraged people to turn toward religion, ushering a more conserva-
tive social climate. Saddam Hussein began to give more control to 
Sunni-based religions groups and tribes, particularly in Western Iraq in 
areas such as Ramadi, Fallujah, and Tikrit, where he was generally 
supported. Gradually, women's rights and freedoms began to be 
increasingly limited in order to appease religions and tribal groups 16• 
Despite this coaservative shift, Iraqi women who had known greater 
' 
freedoms before this era were not completely constrained. Some 
members of this older generation continued to have access to the public 
sphere; some continued working outside the home, and others ran small 
businesses from their homes. 
By the end of the 1990s, however, a number of gaps were appearing 
among women -in the labor force: 
A generation gap had emerged between older women who where 
literate, educated and worked outside the home and their daughters wl10 
14 Ibid .. 
15 Windows of Opportunity: The Pursuit of Gender Equali8ty in J>ost-War Iraq, Women for 
Women International Briefing Paper (January 2005), p.9. 
16 [bid. 







were not in the work force, often more socially conservative, and had not 
received the same level of education as their mothers . 
. Additionally, during the sanctions, middle-class Iraqi women who 
expressed allegiance to .the Ba'athist party were offered opportunities 
including secure jobs and training. Many of those who refused to join 
the Ba'athist party were forced back to. their homes, having lost their 
jobs. 
In sum, by the end of the 1990s, the country had found in addition 
' 
to oil another resource to waste - large segments of its fe1nale popula-
tion. 
As for the present, women appear to be beset with a number of old 
as well as new constraints17: 
The new access to satellite dishes., Internet cafes and cell phones has 
given these young women a new window on the outside world. But 
creeping religious conservatism, lawlessness and economic uncertainty 
have also been conspiring against them in peculiar ways. 
In particulcir, it appears that in the power vacuum left by the 
Ba'thists, religions conservatism is forcing women to stay indoors for 
long periods of time, wear hijab, if tl1ey do go out, and dissuade women 
from taking part in politics. A recent survey conducted by Iraq's Ministry 
of Education has shown the decreasing number of female students at the 
primary level. The survey conducted in the fall of 2004 and covered 2000 
schools and educational establishments found that the number of 
registered students of almost one million has only 900,000 females 18• 
The one bright spot for women is in the Kurdish north in Iraq. 
According to USA Today "Kurdish women travel there freely, hold 
high-level economic and political positions and have been critical to the 
region's revival. Kurdish women serve as judges, business owners and 
operators, and two regional government ministers are women 19• 
As noted above, a large percentage of Iraqi women are widowed, 
divorced, or abandoned as a result of multiple wars. A significant 
17 Quoted in Luke Thomas, "Women in Post-War Iraq and Afghanistan Digital Freedom 
Network (July 9, 2004). 
18 
"Students Dropping Out of Schools in Iraq," Noozz.com (November 20, 2004). 
19 Quoted in Luke Thomas, "Women in Post-War Iraq and Afghanistan Digital Freedom 
Network (July 9, 2004). 
\ 
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. number of Iraqi women are heads of households and their lack of 
income has serious consequences for the viability of their families and 
the economy as a whole20• Despite the need for income, a recent survey 
of Iraqi women indicated that 43.2% feel that women's work opportuni-
ties should be restricted21 • 
The primary reason for limiting women's work was lack of security 
and stability (54.5% ). 
The second reason, given by a much smaller percentage of survey 
participants, was Iraqi traditions and customs (15.5% ). 
The third .reason cited by participants was a lack of work opportuni-
ties (by 13.1 % ). 
Interestingly, of the top three reasons given to limit women's par- · 
ticipation in the workforce, current circumstances (security, stability and 
job availability) outweigh cultural concerns (Iraq tradition and customs) 
by more than four to one (67.6% to 15.5% ). 
More than half of the women surveye_d saw no reason to limit their 
participation in the workforce, but willingness and opportunity are 
different measures. The overwhelming majority (87.3%) of women felt 
that they or others in their families did not have enough access to work 
opportunities, and most (62%) felt that there was no change in access to 
job opportunities in the last year. 
The current difficulties faced by business women are best seen 
through their personal accounts: 
I graduated from the college of engineering, but I'm not working in my 
field. I first worked in a company as a typist, then as a secretary, and 
then I went to the analysis of tenders and offers. When I saw that I had 
enough capability to create my own business, I began to work for my- • 
self. I started small, but now I own a contracting company. Dealing with 
men is hard because many of them don't respect us and won't help us, 
because they think that we are competing with them and that we exploit 
f . . . 22 our em1nm1ty . 
There are explosions everywhere, and we can't work after dark because 
it's dangerous, but what can we do? If I stay home my company will go 
20 Windows of Opportunity: The Pursuit of Gender Equality in Post-War Iraq, Women for 
Women lntema~ional Briefing Paper (January 2005), p.9. 
21 lbid. 
22 Quoted in Ali Al-Shouk, "Business in Iraq," Iraq Today (December 15, 2003). 
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broke for sure23• 
These and other accounts paint a picture of Iraq's informal econ-
omy as not all that different in many regards from that in many less 
developed countries, especially those experiencing some sort of 
instability or post-war transition. Again despite the many unique aspects 
of the Iraqi situation, international comparative studies provide some 
perspective on the patterns one might expect to unfold24: 
The majority of women ~n the informal sector are own account 
traders and producers or casual and subcontract workers; relatively few 
are employers who hire paid workers. 
Men and women · tend to be involved in different activities or types 
of employment even within the 'Same trades. Male traders tend to have 
larger scale operations and to deal in non-food items wl1ile female 
traders tend to have smaller scale ope.rations and to deal in food items. 
Average incomes of both men and women are lower in the informal 
sector than in the formal sector. 
The gender gap in income/wages appears higher in the informal 
sector than in the formal sector and exists even when women are not 
wage workers. 
Informal incomes worldwide tend to decline as one moves across 
the following types of employment: employer, self employed, casual 
wage worker, and sub-contract worker. 
Women tend to be under-represented in high-income activities and 
over-represented in low income activities (notably subcontract work). 
To sum up, the present infrastructure and security situation has 
negatively impacted women's economic opportunities. As violent 
conflict continues, female heads of household in particular face a 
significant economic burden as work in the formal sector, except for 
those fortunate to secure jobs in the pubic sector, has diminisl1ed. 
Women are more likely to work in the informal sector, selling products 
from home, catering, or in small scale agriculture. However, the 
constraints posed by inadequate electricity and water directly impact on 
23 Ibid. 
24 Adapted from Martha Alter Chen, "Women in the Informal Sector: A Global Picture, the 
Global Movement," SAIS Review XXI:l (Winter-Spring 2001), p.77. 
·. 
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the economic situation. The overwhelming majority of women are not 
earning any income. According to the women surveyed, 84.3% reported 
that they do not receive any financial compensation for their work25• 
It is probably safe to say that, in terms of numbers of women, the 
coping economy is considerably larger than it was towards the end of the 
Saddam Hussein regime. On the other hand, large numbers of women 
probably have slipped down the income scale from employers to casual 
workers. The overall average income level of women in the sector are 
therefore likely to be lower, both in absolute terms and relative to those 
women fortunate enough to work in the public sector. 
Prospects for Women in the Informal Economy 
What seems in store for women in the coping/informal economy? · 
What are the links between being a woman, working in the informal 
sector and being poor? A high perce~tage of people working in the 
informal sector, relative to the formal sector are poor especially if they 
are women. However, there seems to be no simple relationship between 
working in the informal economy and being poor or working in the 
formal economy and escaping poverty. 
One consequence of Saddam's war adventures and brutality is that 
women constitute 60% of Iraq's voting age population. Women 
benefited from the CP A's policy of paying all public sector employees 
salaries, which at times exceeded their pre-war levels by a factor of ten. 
Women are heavily represented in this sector as teachers and adminis-
trators. At the same time many men lost their source of income in 
industry and the military. This is creating a dynamic within Iraqi society. 
On the other hand, some religious activists who have come iI1to the fore 
since the collapse of the regime are promoting policies, which would 
further circumscribe women's freedoms26• 
Still there are some encouraging signs. Many Iraqis are still depend-
ent on subsidized goods, such as wheat, sugar and fuel, but spending on 
consumer goods has risen dramatically since April 2003 and this has had 
25 
"Windows of Opportunity: The Pursuit of Gender Equality in Post-War Iraq," Women for 
Women International Briefing Paper January 2005, p.17. 
26 Mary Kaldor and Yahia Said,"Regime Change in Iraq: Mission Report, The Centre for the 
Study of Global Governance (December 2003). 
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a positive knock-on effect on employment and salaries27• This expansion 
in consumption should provide numerous opportunities for women in 
the informal sector. 
Overall, there are some very initial signs that the economy might be 
recovering. In an extensive poll in midaJanuary 2005 carried out by an 
affiliate to the ministry of planning, 61~3% said that their living standard 
was much better now. Respondents indicated that they had been able to 
purchase more food with their income than was the case two years ago. 
However, 26.9% said that the ·standard of .living had not changed during 
the same period. Adding that they were still purchasing the same 
amount of foodstuff for the sam<? family income they used to get before 
and after 2003. Yet, 68% of the participants also pointed out that the 
overall living standards was much better prior to 2003, while 16.5% said 
it was worse. Out of the 3313 Iraqis who took part in the survey, 64.3% 
said that they had expected more positive changes in the economy 
during the year. The survey also showed active participation of the Iraqis 
in the political process, where 46% said that they were now more than 
ever interested in politics28• 
Also encouraging is the fact that a number of innovative programs 
are being implemented that should assist women rising to higher 
incomes through progressing the ranks of casual wage worker, self-
employed to employer. The World Bank has awarded a $50,000 grant 
from its Post-Conflict Fund to the Iraqi Widow's Organization (IWO) 
for a project to improve the livelihoods of young widows with children 
affected by the recent conflict and violence. The pilot project aims to 
boost widows' incomes in the city of Diwaniyah, south of Baghdad, by 
providing them with microcredit to start their own businesses and 
training to build skills needed in the job market29• 
A recent Iraqi-led study on the status and needs of women in the 
central governorate of Qadissiya, wh.ere Diwaniyah is located, revealed 
that female-headed households were the most vulnerable group. 
Approximately seven percent of women between the ages of 20-40 are 
27 Simon Kitchen, "Shia Victory Underscores Uncertainty," Financial Times February 13, 2005. 
2s "Living Standards Have Improved In Iraq, Poll Says," Noozz.com January 3 J, 2005. 
2~ Shaha Riza, "Post-Conflict Grant to Boost Iraqi Widows' Income Through Micro credit,'' 
worldbank.org (May 15, 2004). 
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widows, most of them with children. In response to their socio-economic 
challenge, the proposed project will train some 120 women to become 
self-reliant and develop small businesses through training and micro-
credit30. 
The Iraqi Widow's Organization is a non-governmental organization 
(NGO) founded in June 2003. To date, it provided small loans and 
training to 300 women. Lack of funding, however, has prevented the 
NGO from extending assistance to other cities across Iraq in need of its 
services. Unfortunately, while small business loans may solve many of 
the problems faded by women in the i·nformal sector, the commercial 
banking system is still unable to provide this service31• 
Assessment 
Iraqi women in the informal sector !ace a difficult future the extent 
to which depends largely on their educational backgrounds, Ba'athist 
ties during the previous regime, the strength of various religious groups 
opposed to women pursuing activities outside of the household, and the 
areas in which they would like to pursue a career. 
Older women with ~ome education may find that their knowledge 
I 
deteriorated considerably during the period of sanctions. They may have 
to be retrained before resuming work in their chosen area. Younger 
women may have to receive basic education before they can hope to 
aspire beyond the lower levels of the informal economy. 
Women with higher level positions in the Ba'athist party during the 
1990s may find that they are effectively barred from the public sector. 
No doubt many of these will also lack the skills and training to succeed 
in the informal economy, especially if it entails strong business skills and 
a willingness to assume some risk. In addition to constraints imposed by 
religious groups, credit would appear to be the main factor limiting 
women from running small businesses in the informal sector. While 
some micro-credit efforts are yielding encouraging results the ability and 
30 Ibid.. 
31 
Cf. Robert Looney," Postwar Iraq's Financial System: Building from Scratch," Middle 
East Policy Xii:l (Spring 2005), Pp.134~149. 
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willingness of the country and its banking system to development this 
area of support is in doubt. 
Many matters related directly to women began coming to a head in 
2005 with the drafting of the country's formal constitution. While 
numerous issues surround the constitution, those most affecting women 
center on the role of Islam, together with some specific issues concern-
ing women's rights. There is wide agreement among. Iraqis that Islam 
should be the nation's official religion, as it is in most of the region's 
constitutions. However there is considerable contention concerning the 
role given to sharia, or Islamic law. 
Many religious Shiites want to see sharia acknowledged as the sole 
• 
source of Iraq's law. These groups want the final constitution to state 
that sharia will govern marriage, divorce, inheritance and other so-called 
personal status issues for the nation's Muslims. Clearly a movement in 
this direction would jeopardize many rights granted to women by the 
previous regime. On the other, hand the Kurds and other secularists 
want sharia to be acknowledged as one of a numb~r of sources of Iraq's 
law. 
In addition, Shiite religious leaders want to reverse a 1959 law that 
settles domestic concerns - issues of marriage divorce and inheritance -
, in civil courts and move such matters to religions courts. Under an early 
draft of the constitution, women would be stripped of their rights to 
inherit property on an equal basis as men, and their legal protections in 
case of divorce would be wakened. Some women also fear that that their 
wish requiring that women hold at least 25 percent of the National 
Assembly seats will ultimately be denied. 
Given the numeric strength of the Shiia and the rising strength of 
religious over secular groups, there is a good chance the final constitu-
tion will at a minimum require Islam to be a main source for legislation 
and that no law contradict Islamic standards. If Islam becomes the main 
source, then laws will be open to interpretation. If this is the case, 
marked regional differences in interpretation and enforcement will 
occur with the Kurdish and perhaps many Sunni areas retaining most 
existing women's rights, while in the Shiite areas women will see a clear 
decline in their legal status. 
In sum, what happ~ns to women in the new Iraq will be largely 
The Journal of Socia~ Political and Economic Studies 
\ 
\ 
The Economics of Coping: the Plight of Women in Iraq's Informal Economy 303 
. controlled by developments in the formal, combat, and shadow 
economies, as well as the growing power of religious groups. The 
ultimate impact is likely to be regional specific with subtle differences 
established throughout the country. The over-all condition of women in 
the country will be a good barometer of the manner in which the country 
and its economy is likely to evolve over the next few years. 
Based on some of the mechanisms implied in the discussion above, a 
wide number of scenarios are possible. However, because many of the 
forces at work in the Iraqi economy and society are pulling in different 
directions, especially as they relate to women, the number of possible 
outcomes are to numerous to explor~ in any detail. Three of the more 
likely courses of development are: 
1. If the insurgency expands its operations, law and order and basic 
economic functions will be under continued stress. The shadow 
economy will expand through jncreased kidnappings, illegal trade 
and other criminal activities. Much of the shadow economy's gain 
will go toward funding the insurgency and the combat economy, 
creating an increasingly difficult vicious circle to break out of. Here 
the effect will be to expand the coping economy as more and more 
women retreat to household work, unable to find a job in the 
formal sector as well as viable informal work out of the household. 
~ As older women's skills further deteriorate and girls postpone 
school or drop out completely, women will increasingly occupy the 
lower echelons of an expanding informal economy. 30% chance. 
2. The insurgency is gradually contained and with it the combat 
economy. However, high levels' of corruption throughout the 
government will permit a thriving shadow economy. Government 
corruption, together with poor law and order will discourage large-
scale foreign investment. The bureaucracy and thus formal job 
opportunities for women will open and expand somewhat, but 
employment will these will be restricted to certain groups. For 
others, the financial system will gradually recover, and expanded 
small-scale credit to educated, motivated women. Religion will 
have a growing strength, especially in light of massive corruption 
and crime. Women currently without much formal education or 
those girls ready for school will find limited opportunities for 
relevant training or access to rewarding employment. The coping 
economy will contract somewhat because of the generally better 
security and economic situation. However, this contraction will be 
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due mainly to women gradually withdrawing from the labor force 
rather than advancing in large numbers to the formal sector. 50% 
chance. · 
3. Democratic values begin to take hold and the insurgency fades away. 
While not Ba'athist, the government assumes many of the 
successful programs undertaken by the Ba'athists during the 1970s 
and early 1980s32• The state is largely secular, although religious 
groups maintain considerable power and influence. Education for 
both men and worn.en is emphasized, with considerable funding 
available for better schools a s well as improved health and 
sanitation. The child labor situation improves and women are able 
to take advantage of a wide range of employment opportunities 
outside of the home. Both the shadow and coping economies are 
gradually assimilated by tlie formal economy. 20% chance. 
32 For a detailed description of these programs see Robert Looney, "Return to Ba'thist 
Economics? Escaping Vicious Circles in Iraq," Orient 45:3 (2004), pp.385-400. 
The Journal of Socia~ Political and Economic Studies 
- ------------- ----- \ 
\ 
